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Executive Pay Regulation
I. INTRODUCTION
Executive compensation in the U.S. is under intense scrutiny by legislators,
regulators, and investor advocates. Excessive or poorly structured compensation
arrangements have been blamed for the U.S. financial crisis of 2008 as well as the
malfeasance in recent years at Enron, WorldCom, and other major U.S. corporations.1
A key complaint is that executive compensation is insufficiently focused on the longterm, leading to reckless, short-term decision making by executives, and, at the
extreme, financial bubbles that inevitably burst with negative consequences extending
far beyond the employees and shareholders of the companies directly involved.2
After years of rhetoric, but little action, it appears that the federal government
may be poised to take meaningful steps to increase executive compensation
regulation. Moreover, combating short-termism appears to be high on the agenda.
The recent federal bailout legislation specifies that incentive compensation granted to
senior executives must be in the form of restricted stock that may not vest until the
government loans are repaid,3 and influential congressmen advocate broader
application of rules tying executive pay to long-term performance.4 Academic
commentators seem to agree. Even some commentators who do not favor capping the
amount of executive compensation favor restrictions on the form and term of
executive pay.5 Professors Roberto Romano and Sanjai Bhagat have recently
recommended that all executive incentive pay take the form of restricted stock or
restricted stock options that cannot be sold/exercised during employment or for two to
four years following termination.6 To be sure, Bhagat and Romano only propose
mandating such a rule for firms receiving bailout funds. Otherwise they would leave
the decision to individual boards of directors.7 On the other hand, Judge Posner has
recently advocated that firms be required to deliver a minimum percentage of CEO
pay in the form of restricted stock that could not be sold for some specified number of
years.8
1

See, e.g., Judith F. Samuelson & Lynn A. Stout, Are Executives Paid Too Much?, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 25, 2009 (attributing the financial crisis to short-term thinking, driven in part by compensation
plan design).
2
See Samuelson & Stout, supra note 1.
3
See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, H.R. 1, 111th Cong. §1 [hereinafter
ARRA].
4
See, e.g., Susanne Craig, Cuomo, Frank Seek to Link Executive Pay, Performance, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 13, 2009 (relating comments of House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney
Frank).
5
See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and
Committing to the Long-term (Working Paper, Feb. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1336978; Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if so, What if Anything Should be
Done About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013 (2009).
6
See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5.
7
However, Bhagat and Roman note that an argument could be made for extending a
mandatory regime to all FDIC insured institutions. See id. at 7. See also, Samuelson & Stout, supra
note 1 (advocating that executives be required to hold “a significant portion of their equity for a period
beyond their tenure,” but not suggesting that such a rule be mandated).
8
See Posner, supra note 5, at 1045-46.
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Executive Pay Regulation
Of course, company directors can be encouraged to link executive pay more
closely to long-term performance, but given the current push for more coercive
measures, this essay considers the possible role of federal regulation in deterring
reckless behavior, earnings manipulation, and other pathologies associated with shorttermism. I am not concerned specifically with compensation at bailed out firms, or
even at financial firms generally, but with broadly applicable executive pay regulation
that could or should follow from the current crisis.9 This essay makes the following
points.
First, attempting to regulate the form and term of executive compensation is as
challenging as attempting to regulate the amount. Any regulatory response would
have to consider the substantial complexity and diversity of current executive pay
arrangements, uncertainty as to the underlying reasons (and hence appropriate
remedies) for short-termism, and the potential conflict between deterring reckless
short-term behavior and encouraging sufficient risk-taking to maximize share value
over the long term. As an example of the latter challenge, consider a rule that would
force executives to hold a creditor risk in their companies until retirement. Such a
rule might be an excellent way of deterring earnings manipulation and bet-thecompany risks but might cause executives to act too conservatively, undermining
long-term value maximization.
Second, close examination of existing programs and proposals for combating
short-termism reveals several serious concerns that suggest that these approaches may
not be suitable as models for executive pay regulation generally. For example,


Approaches that would restrict incentive pay to one or two equity-based
instruments would eliminate valuable diversity in executive pay arrangements,
barring not only short-term incentives, but also non-equity arrangements that
tie executive wealth to firm performance over the long term.



Approaches that would require executives to hold equity until retirement
would impose significant burdens on executives in terms of reduced liquidity
and under-diversification. These burdens would increase the wedge between
the cost of equity incentives to shareholders and their value to executives.



In order to avoid circumvention, approaches that would restrict the term of
incentive pay must be tightly circumscribed, e.g., by capping the amount of
non-incentive pay or specifying a percentage of pay that must be in the form
of long-term incentives. As a result, existing proposals either impose

9

As Jeff Gordon argues, “[c]ompensation design in financial firms can have systemic effects”
that call for a distinct and specific regulatory approach. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”:
Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, ___ HARV. J. LEG. ___
(2009) (proposing compensation structures that force employees of financial firms to internalize the
risks they create).

3

Executive Pay Regulation
inefficient one-size-fits-all solutions on diverse firms, industries, and
executives or are easily circumvented.
Finally, this essay considers how federal regulation directed at short-termism
might be shaped to increase the chances that the benefits would outweigh the harms.
After all, some additional regulation may be inevitable, and less coercive regulation
might even be desirable. Two ideas are offered. First, this essay argues that policy
makers should consider focusing regulation solely on the term of pay while leaving
the choice of instrument to individual companies in order to preserve as much
efficient diversity in pay arrangements as possible. Term-only regulation is not
unambiguously preferable to existing proposals because of the risk that it would result
in excessive conservatism, but it would get at the root of the current short-termism
concern and is an option that should be on the table if regulation is to be pursued.
Second, depending on the ultimate source of the short-termism phenomenon,
disclosure-based regulation focused on the average holding period of executive pay
could help mitigate the worst examples of short-termism while avoiding many of the
costs and unintended consequences of compulsory regulation.
The bottom line is that regulating the term of executive pay is no less challenging
than regulating the amount and may not be worth undertaking. Legislators,
regulators, and other observers may be frustrated by this situation, but the pitfalls
should be recognized.

II. WHAT IS SHORT-TERMISM, AND WHY DOES IT EXIST?

Perhaps the leading corporate governance concern of legislators and
commentators at the present is the reckless pursuit of short-term profits by corporate
executives who will have cashed out before the long-term repercussions are felt. The
pathology sometimes appears in the form of earnings manipulation, which often
involves sacrificing long-term share value to boost near-term earnings.10 Enron
Corporation, where earnings manipulation was practiced as an art and eventually
evolved into fraud and led to bankruptcy, is the poster child for this branch of shorttermism.11 However, short-termism often takes the form of completely legal, but
excessively risky behavior, such as banks adopting lax lending standards or financial
firms taking on too much exposure to derivatives. Judith Samuelson and Lynn Stout
have argued that the overarching cause of the 2008 financial crisis was “business

10

See, e.g., John R. Graham et al, Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions, FIN.
ANALYSTS J., Nov.-Dec. 2006, at 27, 31 (reporting results of a survey of over 400 CFOs indicating that
over half of respondents were willing to sacrifice shareholder value in order to achieve earnings
targets).
11
See Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 9-11
(2003) (describing Enron’s abusive use of mark-to-market accounting and special purpose entities to
manipulate earnings).
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leaders taking on excessive risk in the quest to increase next quarter’s profits.”12 To
be clear, the concern is not just that executives fail to establish sufficient risk controls,
but that executives affirmatively seek out high risk, high short-term return
strategies.13
Why does short-termism allegedly run rampant in corporate board rooms? Most
commentators point to short-term accounting-based bonuses that incent managers to
maximize current year profits at the expense of long-term share value14 and short
vesting stock options that cause managers to prefer strategies that increase stock price
volatility, even if those strategies do not maximize expected returns. But
compensation arrangements can only be a proximate cause. They cannot be an
ultimate cause of short-termism. Why are compensation arrangements too short-term
focused? As we will see in this Part, that is a very complex question, and its
elusiveness is one reason that combating short-termism is so difficult.
A. Market Myopia
One possible answer is that existing executive compensation arrangements reflect
myopic investor preferences.15 Shareholders, in other words, do not want managers
to focus any more on the long term than they already do. Indeed, Samuelson and
Stout argue that “institutional and individual investors alike [have become]
preoccupied with quarterly earnings forecasts and short-term price changes.”16
However, in order for the stock market as a whole to exhibit myopia, that is, to
account for myopia existing in an environment populated with sophisticated
arbitrageurs, one must posit a market imperfection, such as information asymmetry,
which leads to systematic discounting of long-term opportunities.17 It is certainly
plausible that investors would have relatively greater difficulty evaluating managerial

12

See Samuelson & Stout, supra note 1.
Although earnings manipulation and reckless risk taking may be viewed as two
manifestations of a common phenomenon, their remedies may be quite different. For example,
clawback provisions in executive compensation agreements that allow firms to recoup bonuses that are
paid based on inaccurate financial results that are later restated may be an effective means of
combating earnings manipulation but would not mitigate excessive risk taking. See, e.g., ARRA,
supra note 3, at § 111(b)(3)(B) (requiring TARP participants to have provisions in place for the
recovery “of any bonus, retention award, or incentive compensation paid to [specified executives and
employees] based on statements of earnings, revenues, gains, or other criteria that are later found to be
materially inaccurate”).
14
See Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, in CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURING & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 3, 10-11(John M. Stern et al eds., 1989).
15
On market and managerial myopia, see generally Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and
Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61 (1988) [hereinafter Stein, Takeover Threats]; Jeremy C.
Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J.
ECON. 655 (1989) [hereinafter Stein, Efficient Capital Markets]; Brian Cadman & Jayanthi Sunder,
Investor Myopia and CEO Horizon Incentives (Working Paper, June 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 956601.
16
Samuelson & Stout, supra note 1.
17
See Stein, Takeover Threats, supra note 15.
13
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claims regarding the costs and benefits of long-term projects,18 but empirical evidence
concerning market myopia is mixed.19 Of course, if the market is myopic, we would
expect executive compensation arrangements to reflect this myopia and to focus
excessively on current earnings generation.
B. Managerial Myopia
Even if markets are not inherently myopic, managers might be. First, managers
might believe that the market is myopic and shape their own behavior accordingly.20
Second, consistent with a model developed by Professor Stein, managers might
rationally behave myopically as a result of a sort of prisoner’s dilemma, even if they
know that the market is efficient in equilibrium.21 Third, in some cases, managers
might have a shorter investment horizon than shareholders because they expect to
retire or leave the company in the near term and hence are not motivated to pursue
long-term goals.22
In these situations, managerial and investor preferences are not aligned, and one
must invoke agency costs to explain why managers would be allowed to act on their
myopic preferences. Suppose the market is not inherently myopic, but managers are.
In order to overcome managerial myopia, managerial wealth should be tied to firm
performance over the longer-term, which, in the view of finance theorists, helps
explain vesting requirements on stock and options and long-term incentive plans with
multi-year horizons.23 But managers resist having too much of their wealth tied to
long-term performance because of the negative effects on the diversification of their
portfolios and liquidity.
The optimal pay arrangement would balance the
shareholders’ desire for long-term incentives against managerial risk aversion and
liquidity concerns. As a result, even the optimal pay arrangement would be more
short-term focused than shareholders would prefer.24

18

See Samuelson & Stout, supra note 1 (“It is extremely difficult for an outside investor to
gauge whether a company is making sound, long-term investments by training employees, improving
customer service, or developing promising new products.”)
19
The empirical evidence on both market and managerial myopia is inconclusive. It has been
suggested that the growth in private equity buyouts, which free firms to focus on long-term gains, is
some evidence of market myopia. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate
Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PENN. L.REV. 1021, 1086 (2007). Others point to positive
stock market reaction to long-term investment as evidence against market myopia. However, Stein
notes that such behavior is consistent with managerial myopia since shareholders will highly value new
investment approved by reluctant managers. See Stein, Takeover Threats, supra note 15, at 77.
20
See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 39 U.C.L.A. L.REV. 811, 865 (1992).
21
See Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 15 (positing model in which current
earnings signal future earnings, firms inflate current earnings to signal future prospects, investors
discount current earnings accordingly, but no firm can credibly defect).
22
See Black, supra note 20.
23
See Cadman & Sunder, supra note 15, at 1 (citing sources).
24
Cf. Keith J. Crocker & Joel Slemrod, The Economics of Earnings Manipulation and
Managerial Compensation, 38 RAND J. ECON. 698, 707 (2007) (demonstrating that in a hidden action
model the optimal managerial contract would permit some earnings manipulation).
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In addition, managers have every incentive to reduce their risk exposure, below
that ostensibly agreed to, by negotiating hard on seemingly insignificant details of
their compensation, such as vesting schedules, ex ante, and through hedging,
backdating option grants, and similar schemes ex post.25 If one is a fervent believer
that boards faithfully and capably represent shareholder interests and that executive
pay arrangements reflect optimal contracting, there would be less of a reason to worry
about inadequate term from the shareholders’ perspective. However, if one believes
that managers exert significant control over their own pay packages, one would
expect pay arrangements to be appreciably short-term focused.26
C. Externalities
Next, even if the capital markets accurately and efficiently gauge short- and longterm opportunities and risks, pay arrangements might be too short-term focused from
a social perspective. Not all of the costs that result from myopic firm behavior are
borne by parties to the contracts, at least not in the cases in which short-termism has
been taken to an extreme. At Enron, at WorldCom, and certainly at the banks at the
center of the subprime mortgage-sparked financial crisis, a significant portion of the
cost has been borne by employees who own few shares, by suppliers, by the
communities at large, and in some cases by taxpayers. If the shareholders and the
managers retain between them a larger fraction of the gains from short-term, risky
behavior when such behavior pays off than they do of the costs when things go
wrong, we should expect firms to take on more risk and for pay packages to be more
short-term focused than would be optimal for society as a whole.27
D. Regulatory Push
Finally, past regulation of executive pay may have encouraged compensation
design that promotes short-termism. First, although accountants were generally of the
view in the early 1990s that stock option expense should be recognized as an expense
for financial accounting purposes, the Financial Accounting Standards Board failed to

25

At the extreme, hedging transactions can completely eliminate firm-specific risk. See
David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundations of Incentive
Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440 (2000). As a result of backdating, executives effectively
replaced risky at-the-money options with less risky in-the-money options. See David I. Walker,
Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and Observations on the Stock Option Scandal, 87 B.U.
L.REV. 561 (2007).
26
Under a managerial power view of the executive compensation setting process, pay is
capped in part by investor outrage, and managers seek out low salience means of boosting their pay.
One way to subtly increase the value of a pay packages is to decrease its risk, and shortening the term
of equity and non-equity incentives is one way to decrease risk. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al.,
Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
751 (2002) (proposing a managerial power theory of the executive pay setting process); LUCIAN
BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004) (same).
27
This, of course, is the standard problem associated with negative externalities. See Ronald
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.& ECON. 1 (1960).
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mandate option expensing until 2004.28 Prior to this, options were uniquely free
goods from an accounting perspective.29 The compensation alternatives – restricted
stock, accounting-based incentives, and, of course, salary – all resulted in an expense
under GAAP. Second, in promulgating IRC § 162(m) in 1993, Congress encouraged
firms to redirect executive salaries into performance-based pay, and the regulations
made it particularly easy to qualify conventional stock options as fully deductible
executive compensation.30 Both of these decisions made stock options particularly
attractive as a compensation device and may have contributed to overuse.31
The accounting treatment of options has now been rationalized, and aggregate use
of options by U.S. companies is much reduced versus the late 1990s/early 2000s.32
That change may have already reduced short-termism pressure to some extent, but
many companies continue to rely heavily on stock option compensation for their most
senior executives.33

III. FIVE GENERIC CHALLENGES TO A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO SHORTTERMISM

Part IV will consider several specific approaches to regulating the link between
executive pay and long-term firm performance based on the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP) legislation and suggestions of commentators. We will see that each
has serious shortcomings as a model for general coercive regulation. Before turning
to specific approaches, however, this Part explores several generic challenges to
regulatory intervention aimed at combating short-termism that might be
underappreciated by regulators or commentators.
A. Uncertain Source and Extent = Uncertain Remedy
28

See FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 123:
SHARE-BASED PAYMENT (REVISED 2004) [hereinafter SFAS 123R] (requiring “fair value” accounting
for all equity compensation including options); FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 123: ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION (Oct. 1995)
(requiring firms to present pro forma income statements including option expense, but not mandating
fair value accounting for options).
29
See David I. Walker, Financial Accounting and Corporate Behavior, 64 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 927, 953-57 (2007) (discussing the accounting treatment of options and implications).
30
See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A) (deeming conventional non-discounted options and
SARs to qualify as performance-based pay if certain minimal procedural requirements are satisfied).
31
See Walker, supra note 29, at 953-57 (discussing anecdotal and empirical evidence that the
anomalous accounting treatment of options was a primary factor in their growing use in the 1990s).
32
See David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal
Contracting (Working Paper, Aug. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443170 (documenting
that stock option compensation (including SARs) constituted over 60% of the aggregate ex ante
compensation of S&P 500 senior executives in 2000, and showing that by 2007 the fraction had
declined to 25%).
33
See id. (documenting that 17% of S&P 500 senior executives received options as their only
equity incentives in 2007).
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As we have just seen, there are several factors that may have contributed to shortterm behavior. Moreover, while theory suggests that short-termism could be
systemic, there is much uncertainty regarding the pervasiveness and significance of
the problem. Discussion of short-termism tends to focus on the failings of specific
firms such as Enron, WorldCom, and AIG, but thousands of public companies in the
U.S. exhibit no signs of pathological short-term behavior. Moreover, I am aware of
no empirical evidence establishing that executive pay term is inadequately focused on
long-term performance from either a shareholder or a societal perspective,
systemically.34
This uncertainty increases the difficulty of shaping a regulatory remedy. For
example, if short-termism is primarily the result of market myopia or externalities, a
coercive response might be indicated. Presumably, company directors would need to
be prodded to take steps contrary to the priorities of their executives and their
shareholders. However, if managerial agency problems and compensation opacity are
key contributors, improved disclosure could be a reasonable first step towards
combating short-termism.35 Similarly, if short-termism is systemic, this suggests
more coercive regulation; if limited to a subset of firms, less coercive regulation may
be in order.
The federal government has never attempted strongly coercive regulation of
executive pay. Previous regulation generally has taken the form of tax incentives and

34

There is empirical evidence linking earnings management with strong equity incentives.
See, e.g., Bin Ke, Do Equity-Based Incentives Induce CEOs to Manage Earnings to Report Strings of
Consecutive Earnings Increases? (Working Paper, July, 2005) (finding that firms whose CEOs have
high equity-based incentives are more likely to manage earnings); Pengjie Gao et al, Earnings
Management and Executive Compensation: A Case of Overdose of Option and Underdose of Salary?
(Working Paper, July 2002) (finding a positive relationship between earnings management intensity
and option and bonus amounts and incentive intensity). On the other hand, evidence of a link between
executive compensation design and accounting fraud is mixed. See Crocker & Slemrod, supra note 24,
at 699 (reviewing the literature).
To my knowledge, no one has studied the relationship between equity or incentive
compensation vesting periods and governance, although that relationship would seem to be central to
this issue. Perhaps variation in vesting periods is inadequate to produce statistically significant results,
but although modest, there is some variation in equity compensation vesting periods from firm to firm.
Options vest in three years at roughly half of large U.S. companies, in four years at about 30% of
firms, and in five years at about 15% of companies. See FREDERICK W. COOK & CO., THE 2008 TOP
250: LONG-TERM INCENTIVE GRANT PRACTICES FOR EXECUTIVES 17 (2008).
35
U.S. public companies routinely claim that their executive compensation programs are
designed to ensure a focus on long-term shareholder value. See, e.g., Eli Lilly, Proxy Statement (Form
DEF 14A), at 23 (Mar. 10, 2008) (stating that “compensation should foster a long-term focus”).
Indeed, proxy materials often specifically assert an emphasis on long-term incentives over short-term
incentives. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 27 (Mar. 12, 2008)
(claiming that its CEO pay mix consists of 70% long-term incentives, but excluding from the
calculation about $3 million of perks and other benefits received by the CEO during the fiscal year).
As we will see, however, given the complexity and diversity of modern executive compensation
programs, claims such as these are difficult to assess objectively utilizing existing proxy disclosures.
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disclosure requirements.36 As we will see, strongly coercive regulation carries
significant risks and costs, which may be difficult to justify without more certainty
regarding the source and extent of the problem.
B. Mitigating Short-Termism and Avoiding Excessive Managerial Conservatism
May Be in Tension
Interestingly, while corporate finance researchers have long been concerned with
executive appetites for risk, their focus has generally been on the problem of
excessive conservatism on the part of risk averse executives. Because executives’
human capital and often a disproportionate amount of their financial capital is tied up
in their firms, executives are inherently more risk averse than diversified
shareholders.37 As a result, executives would tend to be more conservative than
shareholders would prefer in selecting projects, making acquisition decisions, etc.,
and fail to maximize the long-term value of the enterprise.38 Of course, this
conservatism problem is much more subtle than the recklessness problem that is the
center of attention today. Nothing blows up if executives are too conservative.
Paying executives with restricted stock tends to increase risk aversion and
conservatism.39 On the other hand, the lack of personal downside risk and the
tremendous upside potential provided by stock options can increase executive
appetites for taking on risk at the firm level.40 This is the traditional corporate finance
explanation for the inclusion of options in executive compensation packages.
The tension between mitigating recklessness and avoiding excessive conservatism
is obvious. The two are just the opposite ends of a continuum. While options can
induce executives to take share value enhancing risks, they can lead to excessive risktaking and earnings manipulation in imperfect capital markets that fail to completely
and instantly incorporate these activities into share prices.41 Forcing executives to

36

See infra Part III.E.
See, e.g., John E. Core et al, Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: a Survey,
FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 7 (summarizing research); Richard A DeFusco et al, The
Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders, 45 J. Fin. 617, 618 (1990).
38
See Core et al, supra note 37, at 7; DeFusco et al, supra note 37, at 618.
39
See Core et al., supra note 37, at 7.
40
See id. (noting that it is optimal to add options to a manager’s compensation package when
the manager’s project selection choices affect firm risk).
Options do not necessarily cause managers to seek risk. Options have an incentive effect, as
described in the text, but they can also produce a risk aversion effect. An option that is far in the
money, for example, resembles restricted stock and may discourage risk taking. Moreover, whether
the incentive effect or risk aversion effect dominates depends on the risk aversion “profile” of the
manager. See, e.g., id.; Thomas Hemmer et al, Introducing Convexity into Optimal Compensation
Contracts, 28 J. ACCT. & ECON. 307 (2000); Jennifer Carpenter, Does Option Compensation Increase
Managerial Risk Appetite?, 55 J. FIN. 2311 (2000).
41
Cf. Crocker & Slemrod, supra note 24 (showing that when managers can conceal actions
and information from shareholders, a compensation contract based on reported earnings cannot provide
managers with the incentive to maximize profits and report them honestly).
37
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hold restricted stock until retirement would mitigate earnings manipulation and betthe-company risk taking, but, as noted, stockholdings actually increase executive risk
aversion and conservatism. Avoiding recklessness and excessive conservatism
requires a very fine balancing act that would seem to be very difficult to achieve with
one-size-fits-all regulation.42
C. Existing Executive Compensation Arrangements Are Complex and Diverse
Executive pay arrangements are more complex and diverse than is generally
recognized. Some of the complexity and diversity may be unnecessary, but there is
evidence that the diversity increases the efficiency of executive pay arrangements.
As this section explains, that diversity makes one-size-fits-all approaches to
combating short-termism problematic.
It is quite common, today, for a senior executive of an S&P 500 company to
receive base salary; one or more annual bonus opportunities; various equity-based
and cash-based long-term incentive pay grants, such as restricted stock, stock options,
performance shares, stock appreciation rights (SARs), long-term incentive plan
(LTIP) units, etc.;43 as well as supplemental retirement contributions, and various
other perks and benefits. As a result of this complexity, the discussion and analysis
section of proxy statements detailing this compensation now routinely runs twenty to
thirty pages.44
Not only are executive pay practices complex; they are increasingly diverse.
Comparing the pay of executives at different firms had become so difficult that in
2006 the SEC began requiring companies to disclose a bottom line total compensation
figure for each senior executive whose pay is detailed in the firm’s proxy statement.45

42

Although the conservatism problem is not inherently a long-term or short-term
phenomenon, there are long-term and short-term aspects. Excessively risk averse executives would
tend to prefer shorter term, more incremental projects, such as cost cutting, which are relatively safe, to
longer-term R&D intensive projects, which are relatively risky. Thus, conservatism could be viewed
as a second and conflicting “short-termism” problem. However, in order to avoid confusion, I will
refer to the latter problem as conservatism and reserve the short-termism label for recklessness.
43
Restricted stock is stock that is granted to an employee provisionally. The stock is forfeited
if it fails to vest because employment is terminated before the vesting date, or, in some cases, because
performance requirements for vesting are not satisfied. Stock options provide the right but no
obligation to purchase company shares at a predetermined exercise price between a vesting date and an
expiration date. Performance shares are similar economically to restricted stock, but employees
receive performance shares after vesting conditions are met, rather than before. SARs are contractual
rights that are economically equivalent to options. LTIPs are typically accounting-based incentive
plans with payoffs determined by firm performance over a several year period. For more detail on
these instruments and their use by the largest U.S. public companies, see COOK, supra note 34.
44
See, e.g., Eli Lilly, Proxy Statement, supra note 35 (21 pages); Johnson & Johnson, Proxy
Statement, supra note 35 (32 pages).
45
See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, SEC Release Nos. 33-8732A;
34-54302A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53158 (Sept. 8, 2006); see also Executive Compensation and Related Person
Disclosure, SEC Release Nos. 33-8655; 34-53185 (Jan. 27, 2006) (discussing motivation).
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Executive incentive pay arrangements, in particular, have become much more
varied over the last decade. Ten years ago, conventional stock options dominated the
landscape at U.S. public companies,46 but their prevalence was in part the result of
favorable accounting treatment that was eliminated in 2004.47 Today the regulatory
playing field for stock, options, and non-equity incentives is much more level,48 and
the use of these instruments is more balanced and diverse. In 2007, for example,
stock options and SARs accounted for only about 33% of the total long-term
incentive compensation of the senior executives of S&P 500 companies.49 Restricted
stock and performance units accounted for about 44%, and non-equity, accountingbased plans accounted for the remaining 23%.50 These figures exclude annual
incentives, which are also generally based on accounting performance.51 They also
gloss over significant variations within the categories. Conventional time-vested
restricted stock and stock options probably accounted for only about 50% of total
long-term incentive compensation for senior S&P 500 executives for 2007.52
The current diversity in compensation instruments may be greater than is optimal
from a shareholder or social perspective,53 but empirical evidence suggests that
diversity increases the efficiency of compensation. For example, there is evidence
that the mix of stock and options granted to executives varies predictably with firm
characteristics such as size and growth opportunities.54

46

At the peak of the dot-com boom, stock options accounted for over 60% of the total
compensation of senior S&P 500 executives as measured on an ex ante basis. Execucomp data.
47
See SFAS 123R, supra note 28.
48
See David I. Walker & Victor Fleischer, Book/Tax Conformity and Equity Compensation,
__ Tax L.Rev. __ (2009) (discussing the tax, accounting, and disclosure treatment of various equity
compensation instruments).
49
Execucomp data.
50
Execucomp data.
51
Annual incentives accounted for about 6% of total 2007 compensation for senior S&P 500
executives. Execucomp data.
52
Author’s estimate based on Execucomp data and a sample of hand collected proxy
statements allowing for subdivision of options into conventional options and SARs and stock into
conventional restricted stock, performance-vested restricted stock, and performance shares.
53
It is an interesting question, although largely beyond the scope of this essay, why these
arrangements have become so complex and diverse. The optimistic story would be that diversity in
company and executive circumstances has led to this diversity in optimal pay arrangements. I have
presented a more pessimistic view elsewhere, namely that the complexity and diversity serve to
obfuscate pay and reduce investor backlash. See David I. Walker, The Manager’s Share, 47 WM. &
MARY L.REV. 587 (2005). See also Bebchuk et al., supra note 26 (proposing a managerial power
theory of the executive pay setting process in which obfuscation reduces investor outrage that restrains
pay); BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 26 (same). However, while the pessimistic view suggests that
shareholders might benefit from simplified executive pay packages, it does not imply that the menu of
compensation choices should be limited legislatively.
54
See, e.g., John Core & Wayne Guay, The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity
Incentive Levels, 28 J. ACCT. & ECON. 151 (1999); Wayne R. Guay, The Sensitivity of CEO Wealth to
Equity Risk: An Analysis of the Magnitude and Determinants, 53 J. FIN. ECON., 43 (1999). Of course,
we cannot know the incremental value of the diversity in executive compensation composition. The
value could be relatively small, but the economic stakes are large.
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Regulatory approaches that would restrict the form of compensation in a quest to
combat short-termism threaten to reduce this diversity and potentially the efficiency
of pay arrangements.55 The idea of restricting incentive pay to a particular instrument
or instruments is even more problematic when combined with the idea of requiring
executives to hold the instrument for an extended period. We have little experience
with very long-term executive incentive pay arrangements and really no idea which
instruments would best link pay and performance over longer periods. Less than 5%
of firms utilize stock or options that vest more than five years out,56 and,
interestingly, while a few firms utilize incentives that remain in place until retirement,
some of those plans are based on accounting results rather than stock prices.57
D. Short-Termism is a Function of More than Annual Compensation
Annual executive pay packages seems to be a natural starting point for attempting
to combat short-termism, and many proposals adopt this perspective, but it is clear
that executive incentives are much more complex. First, the incentives associated
with an executive’s most recent pay package make up only a small part of the
executive’s total compensation-related incentives. In order to properly analyze (or
influence) executive incentives, one must look at the “stock” of incentives
accumulated over time in the form of shares, unexercised options, and other longterm arrangements, not just the annual “flow” of incentives.58 Second, the economic
incentives of founders and some other executives may be dominated by equity
holdings that were not accumulated through compensation at all.
Third,
compensation is not the sole source of incentives. For example, the prospect of
advancement or the threat of dismissal creates incentives that are related to
compensation but vary considerably depending on an executive’s age and career
arc.59

55

Jeff Gordon argues that shareholder “say on pay” mandates could result in much less
diversity in executive pay arrangements as a result of the likely role played by proxy advisory firms
and their incentives. See Gordon, supra note 9. He raises similar concerns regarding the potential loss
of efficiency from more one-size-fits-all pay arrangements. See id. In Gordon’s view, efficient
executive pay arrangements should be expected to be diverse because executive pay serves several
different functions, the importance of which vary from firm to firm and from time to time for particular
firms. See id.
56
See Cook, supra note 34, at 17 (reporting that options vest beyond 5 years at only 2% of
surveyed firms and that stock grants vest beyond 5 years at only 4% of firms).
57
See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson, Proxy Statement, supra note 35, at 29-30 (describing
Certificate of Extra Completion Plan under which executives receive units that are valued based on the
company’s net asset value and earnings power per share and which are payable on retirement).
58
See Core et al, supra note 37, at 4-5 (arguing that it is more appropriate to look at the stock
than the annual flow in evaluating the level of incentives).
59
See, e.g., Atreya Chakraborty et al, Termination Risk and Managerial Risk Taking, 13 J.
CORP. FIN., 170 (2007) (arguing that managerial investment decisions “depend not only on how a
manager’s compensation changes with firm risk but also on how his/her job is affected if the project
fails”); Greg Hallman et al, Carrots and Sticks: Incentive Compensation and the Likelihood of
Termination, (Working Paper, Oct. 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1122548 (arguing that
termination provides a powerful incentive for executives apart from their compensation and may
partially offset the need to provide incentives through other channels).
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All of these incentives, and others, would affect the propensity of managers to
engage in short-term reckless behavior. It is obviously very difficult for firms to
manage these complex webs of incentives and even more difficult for a regulator to
do so. Regulation focused solely on current year compensation is even less likely to
hit the mark.
E. Previous Attempts to Regulate Executive
Circumvention and Unintended Consequences

Pay

Have

Resulted

in

Previous attempts to regulate executive pay at the federal level have consisted
largely of tax incentives and SEC mandated pay disclosure. These initiatives have
achieved mixed success, at best, and often have resulted in circumvention or
unintended consequences. These experiences provide lessons for those wishing to
regulate the form or term of executive pay.
1. Tax Incentives
Congress has twice in the last twenty-five years turned to the tax code in an
attempt to influence executive pay practices. We have already encountered IRC
§ 162(m), which was enacted by Congress in 1993 and limits a corporation’s tax
deduction for non-performance-based pay granted to certain senior executives to $1
million per year. There is some uncertainty as to the goals Congress had in mind in
enacting this provision, but if it was meant to slow the increase in total executive pay,
it was almost certainly unsuccessful.60 If the provision was meant only to re-direct
pay from straight salary to more performance sensitive channels, it was successful,
but may have inadvertently sparked the executive stock option boom of the 1990s.61
There is both good news and bad news here for proponents of regulation
improving the link between executive pay and long-term performance. On the
positive side, the § 162(m) experience suggests that it may be easier to influence the
design of compensation than the amount. On the negative side, the experience
highlights how difficult it is to balance executive incentives. Section 162(m) may
have been too successful in increasing the performance sensitivity of executive pay.

60

See Robert F. Gox, Tax Incentives for Inefficient Executive Pay and Reward for Luck
(Working Paper, 2008) (reporting that the “average total pay of S&P 500 CEOs rose from $2.6 million
in 1993 to $14 million in 2000” and remained at $9.4 million in 2002 even after the burst of the dotcom bubble); see also Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code,
64 WASH. & LEE L.REV. 877, 917-20 (2007) (describing empirical evidence indicating that § 162(m)
was associated with an increase in executive pay).
61
See Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive Compensation, in TAX
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (2000) (finding that salary reductions post-1993 were more than offset by
additional stock option grants); see also Polsky, supra note 60, at 906 (documenting the widespread
belief among informed observers that § 162(m) contributed to the options explosion, but also noting
the lack of clear cut empirical evidence).
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No more effective, apparently, was Congress’s 1984 attempt to rein in excessive
“golden parachute” executive severance packages by restricting corporate tax
deductions for parachute payments and imposing excise taxes on recipients of excess
payments.62 Although the rule initially led to some firms capping parachute
payments at the maximum amount deductible, over time companies began to exceed
the cap, forfeit the deduction on the excess, and “gross up” executives for the excise
tax, effectively shifting the entire cost of non-compliance to the shareholders.63
One lesson to be learned from this experience is that the effectiveness of tax rules
(or other non-compulsory regulation) aimed at executive pay may be limited because
of the significant agency problems in the pay process. Given this track record, one
can readily understand why a more coercive regulatory attack on short-termism might
be appealing, but, of course, the potential inefficiencies and costs of compulsory
regulation are greater.
2. SEC Executive Pay Disclosure Requirements
The SEC’s proxy disclosure rules might be viewed as another attempt to regulate
executive pay. Over the last seventeen years, the SEC has steadily increased the
coverage, depth, and specificity of required disclosures.64 Currently, firms are
required to provide detailed discussion and analysis of executive pay as well as
numerous tables, the content of which is specified in exacting detail, including a
summary compensation table that includes a bottom line total compensation figure for
each of five senior executives.65
These disclosure requirements were not directly aimed at limiting executive pay,
but it is safe to say that many commentators hoped that shedding light on pay
practices would result in greater restraint. However, there is no empirical evidence to
date that the proxy disclosure rules have reduced or slowed the increase in executive

62

See IRC §§ 280G & 4999 (denying deduction and imposing excise tax on severance
payments in excess of an executive’s average compensation over the previous five years).
63
See Bruce A. Wolk, The Golden Parachute Provisions: Time for Repeal?, 21 VA. TAX REV.
125, 136, 139 (2001). Because a gross up payment is subject to income tax and additional excise taxes
and is not deductible for the corporation, the decision to gross up an executive can result in a cost to
shareholders that is an order of magnitude greater than the benefit to the executive. See David I.
Walker, Tax Incentives Will Not Close Stock Option Accounting Gap, TAX NOTES, Aug. 5, 2002.
Nonetheless, a 1996 study reported that over half of CEO contracts included golden parachute gross up
provision. See Carol Bowie & Judy Fischer, Have Parachutes Become More Than Security Blankets?,
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 17, 19.
64
See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, supra note 45 (reviewing
history of executive pay disclosure regulation and noting that regulations issued in 1992 replaced
narrative discussion with tabular disclosure). The 1992 regulations actually marked a return to tabular
presentation that was first mandated in the 1930s and that was replaced by narrative disclosure in the
1980s. See id.
65
SEC Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402.
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pay and good reason to suspect the reverse.66 One of the suspected responses to
systematic executive pay disclosure was a kind of Lake Wobegon effect.67 The idea
was that company boards generally believed that their executives were above average,
or believed that admitting that their executives were below average would undermine
investor confidence.68 In any event, fuller disclosure of pay appeared to lead more
often to pay increases than decreases, as low pay firms sought to bring pay levels up
at least to the average of the relevant peer group.69
Another likely response to enhanced scrutiny under the 1992 disclosure
regulations was a shift in compensation from quite visible channels of pay, such as
salary, stock, and options, to less visible channels, such as pensions.70 However, the
1992 disclosure regime was not comprehensive. It practically invited creative
circumvention. Such subterfuge is rendered less effective by the SEC’s 2006
mandate that firms disclose a bottom line figure including all channels of pay, but it is
probably too early to determine whether the revised rules have had any salutary effect
on the overall amount of executive compensation.
There are at least two lessons to be learned from the SEC’s experience with
mandatory executive pay disclosure. First, to the extent that disclosure regimes are
not comprehensive, we should expect executives to creatively mitigate the impact of
these rules by various circumventions, such as shifting pay channels. Second, we
should be aware that even disclosure regimes can produce unintended consequences,
such as the upward ratcheting in pay following the imposition of the initial disclosure
rules.

IV. PITFALLS OF EXISTING PROGRAMS AND PROPOSALS FOR COMBATING SHORTTERMISM

66

In a study of the effects of benchmarking CEO pay, Professors Bizjak, Lemmon, and
Naveen find that “CEOs with pay below the median of their peers receive substantially larger raises”
than CEOs paid above the median. The authors conclude that their results are consistent with an
efficient system for determining the reservation wage, but they note that “benchmarking… could have
led to greater increases in pay than would have occurred in its absence. See Bizjak et al, Does the Use
of Peer Groups Contribute to Higher Pay and Less Efficient Compensation?, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 152, 166
(2008). Professors Bebchuk and Grinstein document a growth in executive pay between 1993 and
2003 in excess of that which can be explained by changes in firm performance. See Lucian Bebchuk
& Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL’Y 283 (2005).
67
Lake Wobegon, of course, is radio personality Garrison Keillor’s mythical Minnesota
community where “all the children are above average.” See http://prairiehome.publicradio.org/.
68
See Charles Elson, What’s Wrong with Executive Compensation?, 81 HARV. BUS. REV. 68,
72 (2003) (relating comments of DuPont CEO Edward Woolard, Jr.).
69
See Bizjak et al, supra note 66, at 154 (reporting that 73 of 100 randomly selected
companies “mention targeting at least one component of pay at or above the peer group median or
mean”); see also, Rachel M. Hayes & Scott Schaefer, CEO Pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect
(Working Paper, Dec. 2008,) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 966332 (developing a gametheoretic model of the Lake Wobegon effect and demonstrating that the effect can lead to an upward
distortion in equilibrium CEO pay under certain conditions).
70
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra, note 26.
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The generic challenges inherent in attempting to craft a regulatory response to
short-termism are exemplified by several specific programs and proposals that have
been offered by legislators, administrators, and commentators.
Moreover,
examination of these specific approaches highlights additional concerns that arise in
attempting to craft a regulatory response. Consider the following plans, proposals, or
suggestions.


In early February, the Obama administration announced that all incentive
compensation received by top executives at firms receiving “extraordinary
assistance” from the government would have to be in the form of restricted
stock that could not vest before the government loans are fully repaid.71
Congress modified the Treasury plan in the economic stimulus bill that it
passed in mid-February, broadening the reach to include at least one executive
of each participant in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), but
retaining the requirement that executive bonuses be paid in restricted stock
that may not vest until the loans are repaid.72 However, unlike the Treasury
plan that would have capped non-incentive pay at $500,000 per year, ARRA
caps restricted stock incentive pay at one-third of total annual compensation.73



Professors Roberto Romano and Sanjai Bhagat have recently recommended
that all executive incentive pay take the form of restricted stock or restricted
stock options that cannot be sold/exercised during employment or for two to
four years following termination. They would have the Treasury mandate
such a rule for firms receiving bailout funds, and they suggest that an
argument can be made to extend the rule to include managers of all FDIC
insured financial institutions, but otherwise they would leave the decision to
individual boards of directors.74



Jesse Brill, a practitioner and frequent commentator on executive pay has
proposed that executives be barred from cashing in stock until they reach age
65 or are two years past retirement.75



Aspen Institute’s Judith Samuelson and Professor Lynn Stout have suggested
that executives be required to hold “a significant portion of their equity
beyond their tenure.” It is not clear, however, whether they would favor

71

See Press Release, Treasury Dept., Treasury Announces New Restrictions on Executive
Compensation (Feb. 4, 2009).
72
See ARRA, supra note 3. The final act contains some vague language that will be open to
interpretation by the Treasury Department when it writes implementing regulations. See Deborah
Solomon & Mark Maremont, Bankers Face Strict New Pay Cap, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2009.
73
See Press Release, supra note 71; ARRA, supra note 3.
74
See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5.
75
See Mark Maremont & Joann S. Lublin, Loopholes Sap Potency of Pay Limits, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 6, 2009 (quoting Brill).
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regulation to this effect or simply wish to encourage boards to place this
restriction on executive pay.76


Judge Richard Posner has recently advocated that firms be required to deliver
a minimum percentage of CEO pay in the form of restricted stock that could
not be sold for some specified number of years.77

Most of these approaches envision compulsory regulation, and, unless the
underlying causes of short-termism are identified and corrected, some sort of coercive
regulation presumably would be needed to cause boards to alter their pay practices to
deter reckless behavior and earnings manipulation. As we have seen, the shorttermism problem, to the extent that it is a real problem, reflects shareholder
preferences, resulting from market myopia or externalities, is the result of managerial
agency problems, or follows from a current regulatory bias in favor of options. This
Part, in any event, will consider these programs and proposals as models for generally
applicable, coercive regulation of executive pay, and explore the costs and risks that
follow.
A. Diversification, Liquidity, and Valuation Problems Arising from Minimum
Holding Periods
Each of these approaches places a minimum term on some or all incentive pay –
presumably a term that exceeds current vesting practices. Longer holding periods for
incentive pay raise liquidity, diversification, and valuation concerns for participants.
Unless one is prepared to go so far as to place a hard cap on the total compensation
received by executives, which would be an extreme view, one must recognize that the
associated costs would largely be borne by shareholders.78 There is, in short, a
tradeoff between the term of executive pay and the amount of pay.
Bhagat and Romano anticipate some of these concerns. They recognize that
forcing executives to hold stock and options until retirement would leave them underdiversified and facing a lack of liquidity.79 Their response to the diversification
concern is to suggest that the amount of equity pay would be increased to offset the
greater risk.80 The shareholders would compensate the executives, in other words, for
limiting their diversification. But there are two potential problems with this solution.
First, in cases in which compensation term was efficiently set by the market initially,
this combination – more pay and riskier pay – would represent an inefficient

76

See Samuelson & Stout, supra note 1.
See Posner, supra note 5.
78
Under an optimal contracting view of the pay setting process, executive compensation
would be held constant on a risk and liquidity adjusted basis, and shareholders would bear virtually all
of the cost of restrictions placed on vesting. Under a managerial power view, executives might absorb
a fraction of these costs since increased nominal pay, even in compensation for these burdens, could
trigger investor outrage. See Bebchuk et al, supra note 26; BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 26.
79
See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5.
80
See id.
77
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deviation for shareholders from the optimal contract. Second, whether the initial
contract was optimally set or not, the increase in the amount of equity pay could
expose firms and executives to increased outrage over the size of executive pay
packages. As a result, it might be difficult for firms to make their executives whole
on a risk adjusted basis.81
To alleviate the liquidity concern, Bhagat and Romano suggest that firms increase
salaries and that Congress increase the deductibility of executive salaries for
corporate tax purposes to facilitate their doing so.82 This fix suffers from the same
defects as increasing equity pay to compensate for restricting diversification, but, in
addition, using salary to compensate for reduced incentive pay liquidity may actually
undermine the link between pay and long-term performance.83
Of course, even if they are compensated, executives would be tempted to hedge
stock and option grants they are required to hold until retirement as a self-help means
of improving liquidity and diversification.84 Dean Schizer has shown that tax and
securities laws make it difficult and costly for executives to hedge their exposure to
options, but that executives can readily hedge restricted stock in the period between
grant and vesting.85 If the motivation is strong enough, however, executives will
hedge option grants as well. Thus, steps would need to be taken to ensure that
compulsory holding periods are not undermined by increased hedging.
Lengthening equity compensation holding periods would also amplify valuation
problems. As several commentators have suggested, restricted stock issued by the
problem banks accepting bailout funds, which is junior to the claims of the
government and bondholders and that would pay off for the executives only if
conditions improve significantly, resembles an option.86 If so, executives who are
forced to accept such stock and hold it until government loans are repaid or until
termination will reasonably value the stock like an option, i.e., as worth considerably
less than the market price of the stock. Bhagat and Romano suggest that executives
be given more stock to offset the value differential,87 but under current pay disclosure
rules, the market price of this stock, not the lower option value, would be reported as

81

Shareholder outrage is a consideration if one believes that executive pay practices are not
entirely the result of arm’s length contracting between the board and the executives. See Bebchuk et
al, supra note 26; BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 26. Executives might be able to deflect investor
outrage over larger pay packages by pointing out that the changes were imposed upon them by
government regulators. Cf. Polsky, supra note 60, at 906 (arguing that, under a managerial power
model, IRC § 162(m) would have provided managers with an excuse to rewrite compensation contracts
in their favor).
82
See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5.
83
At the extreme, firms that entirely replaced incentive pay with straight salary would create
no direct link between pay and long-term performance.
84
Compensation would not reduce the incentive to hedge.
85
See Schizer, supra note 25.
86
See Victor Fleischer, Conglomerate blog posting (Feb. 4, 2009); Lucian Bebchuk, Congress
Gets Punitive on Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2009.
87
See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5.
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the measure of executive compensation. As a result, executives in this situation
would receive more of something they value less, and the gap between the value of
pay perceived by the executives and by the public would grow even larger.
To be sure, this valuation problem would be most acute at troubled banks
participating in the federal bailout programs, which are not the primary concern of
this essay, but the valuation gap is not unique to troubled banks or to restricted stock.
Bhagat and Romano have also proposed that executive stock options not be
exercisable until two to four years following retirement.88 For the average CEO, they
suggest, this would mean waiting for seven to nine years to exercise options.89
Today, options typically become exercisable three to five years following grant and
are exercised soon thereafter if in the money. Given the liquidity and diversification
constraints discussed above, imposing longer holding periods would significantly
reduce the value of options to executives. Perversely, however, the calculated value
of an option that is assumed to be exercised in eight years would be greater than that
of an option that is expected to be exercised in five to six years.90 At the very least,
we would need to rethink our approach to compensatory option valuation and
disclosure if longer holding periods were imposed.
Of course, if executive pay is too short-term focused today, systemically, some of
the diversification, liquidity, and valuation costs described above are worth incurring.
To the extent that agency problems result in sub-optimally short-term compensation,
shareholders might benefit from regulation that increased the term of pay, even if they
are forced to pay for it. Moreover, to the extent that excessively short-term focused
pay results in negative externalities, shareholders should bear the costs of regulation
that mitigates those externalities. The problem, as discussed in the next section, is
that mandatory, one-size-fits-all vesting periods would be arbitrary and extremely
blunt instruments.

88

See id.
See id. The authors do not consider the average holding period faced by junior executives
under their proposal, but it would certainly be longer than their estimate of the average CEO holding
period.
90
Executive options are valued for disclosure purposes using an option pricing model.
Generally, the expiration date of an option is one of the inputs to these models, and the value of an
option increases with its term. However, in order to adjust for predictable early exercise, the expected
holding period of compensatory options (often five to six years) substitutes in these models for the
contractual time to expiration when calculating value for disclosure and accounting purposes.
Presumably, however, if an option cannot be exercised before retirement and the expected time to
retirement is eight years, that period would be used for valuation purposes resulting in greater
disclosed value. Certainly, there would be no basis for choosing a shorter, counterfactual period. The
root of the problem is that the current option valuation approach utilizes a rough adjustment to the
models for the unique facts of compensatory options, but the adequacy of this approach depends on an
assumption that the current, relatively short vesting periods for options do not significantly impact
exercise behavior. This assumption would not be valid for executives barred from exercising options
for seven to nine years. See SFAS 123R, supra note 28 (describing option valuation methodology that
is used for SEC disclosure as well as financial accounting purposes).
89
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B. The Problem of One-Size-Fits-All Regulation
Part II suggested that the link between executive pay and long-term performance
may be inadequate, systemically, but, even if we accept this premise, no economic
theory or empirical analysis can tell us how inadequate the link is for a particular
firm, industry, or even for U.S. firms on average. Despite this fact, each of the
approaches we have seen involves a one-size-fits-all holding period for equity
compensation. Bhagat and Romano, for example, suggest a holding period of
retirement plus two to four years, which would represent at least a doubling of the
average vesting period of CEO equity compensation and an even greater increase in
the average vesting period of equity granted to subordinate executives.
Perhaps a dramatic shift in executive pay term along these lines is required to
overcome agency problems and force companies to internalize all of the costs of
short-termism. However, any arbitrary holding period or periods for incentive pay
raises the possibility that the term will be excessive and inefficient for some, perhaps
many, firms and their executives.
From the shareholders’ perspective, the optimal term of executive pay would
balance the costs related to diversification, liquidity, and valuation against the
benefits of tying executive wealth to long-term performance.91 The optimal term
would vary considerably by industry, firm, and executive. Consider, for example,
requiring executives to hold equity incentives until retirement. While the benefit of
doing so at similarly situated firms might be fairly constant, the cost would be much
greater for a 40 year old CEO than for a 60 year old CEO. Moreover, while the cost
of this rule might be similar for two 50 year old CEOs, the benefit for a regulated
utility with low growth opportunities, little scope for earnings manipulation, etc.,
might be much less than it would be for AIG. The bottom line is that one-size-fits-all
targets for executive pay term that have real bite will inevitably exceed the optimal
mark for some firms and executives.
C. Limiting Compensation Diversity
We now turn our attention from regulation of the term of incentive pay to
regulation of its form. Each of the approaches discussed would to some extent limit
incentive pay to a specific instrument or instruments. This is troubling for several
reasons. First, as this section describes, instrument-specific regulation limits the
diversity of devices that firms can use in linking pay to long-term performance and
potentially reduces the efficiency of compensation arrangements.
Consider, for example, Bhagat and Romano’s proposal to limit incentive pay to
restricted stock and restricted stock options. Obviously, details would need to be
spelled out, but if the idea behind the proposal is to limit incentives to conventional
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21

Executive Pay Regulation
time-vested restricted stock and options, about half of current long-term incentive pay
(as well as 100% of annual incentives) would be off the table.92
Of course, the acceptable circle of incentive pay could be drawn more widely to
include similar long-term incentive arrangements such as SARs (phantom stock
options), performance-vested restricted stock, and performance shares (essentially
phantom performance-vested restricted stock).93 Performance vesting is generally
based on accounting results,94 which might raise concerns regarding manipulation,
but, as discussed below, manipulation is less of a concern with respect to long-term
incentives than annual bonuses.95 Moreover, companies have legitimate reasons for
avoiding or delaying issuing actual shares through their executive incentive programs.
For example, some phantom equity plans may reflect investor concerns regarding
excessive shareholder dilution from traditional stock and option plans.
However, even if “stock” and “options” are defined broadly to include
performance-vested instruments and non-equity economic equivalents, a compulsory
approach along these lines would bar firms from utilizing pure accounting-based
incentive plans. As noted, long-term accounting-based plans currently account for
almost a quarter of long-term senior executive incentives, while annual accountingbased bonuses account for about 6% of total senior executive pay.96
Of course, accounting-based incentives have been the target of a great deal of
academic criticism.97 Annual accounting-based bonuses tend to increase managerial
myopia and are subject to manipulation. Well documented, for example, is the “big
bath” phenomenon, which entails managers taking operational steps to defer income
and accelerate expenses as it becomes clear that annual targets will not be achieved,
thus improving the prospects for big bonuses the following year.98
However, the opportunities for manipulation and the payoffs decline as the
measurement period increases. Accounting-based LTIPs that measure performance
over three or more years should present much less of a manipulation problem than
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annual bonuses.99 Indeed, such plans might actually represent a stronger commitment
to long-term focus than equity grants as they insulate participants from the influence
of short-term stock price fluctuations. It is not clear that we should preclude firms
from utilizing these plans.100
Moreover, despite their drawbacks, precluding all annual incentives for
executives would appear to be an overreaction to inadequate focus on long-term
performance generally, particularly for the executives junior to the CEO. And
eliminating long-term accounting based incentives would certainly be problematic for
this group. While 100% equity incentive compensation might be appropriate for a
CEO, who ultimately is accountable for the firm’s share price, it would not be
appropriate for a junior executive, who is directly responsible for some facet of
operations and has much less influence over the share price.101
Finally, as discussed above, limiting incentive pay arrangements to stock and
options or any other particular instruments is even more troubling when contemplated
against the backdrop of lengthy new holding period requirements, given our relatively
paltry experience with incentive arrangements extending beyond five years.102
To be sure, requiring that incentives take the form of stock and options would not
necessarily preclude firms from using other performance measures to determine the
amount of equity compensation to be conferred on an executive or, perhaps, from
maintaining accounting-based plans that simply pay out, after the requisite holding
period, using vested stock as currency.103 However, the existing proposals appear to
contemplate that executives would hold equity and be exposed to the firm’s share
price for an extended period. The point is that in many cases another means of
linking executive wealth to long-term firm performance might be more efficient
economically.
D. Excessive Conservatism
Although backlash against stock option compensation is understandable in the
wake of various corporate scandals involving options, regulation along the lines of
the bailout legislation or the approach endorsed by Judge Posner that would limit
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incentive pay to restricted stock might encourage excessively conservative executive
behavior. Moreover, when combined with lengthy holding periods, even approaches
that allowed firms to issue options or stock might do so. Policy makers should be
wary of adopting regulation that discourages long-term value creation in a quest to
mitigate short-termism.
As we have seen, the appetite for risk created by a compensation basket consisting
solely of cash, perks, and restricted stock generally would be less than the appetite of
an ordinary diversified shareholder.104 In order to overcome executive risk aversion
and more accurately align long-term incentives, options are typically added to the
mix.105 Of course, executive incentives are not solely the product of current
compensation. For example, even with a relatively conservative pay package, some
executives would be encouraged to take risks in order to gain recognition and
promotion. Even CEOs, who are unlikely to be auditioning for better jobs, might take
some risks in order to increase the prospects of retaining their jobs. On balance,
however, pay packages lacking options could lead to undue conservatism on the part
of senior corporate executives.
Although Bhagat and Romano are not explicit on this point, it is likely that their
proposal to limit incentive compensation to restricted stock or options reflects the
value of options in aligning long-term incentives. However, while I view this
approach as an improvement over stock-only proposals, even their proposal might
result in excessive conservatism.
As we have seen, imposing lengthy holding periods on incentive pay reduces
executive liquidity, impairs diversification, and increases the wedge between the cost
of equity compensation to firms and the value to executives. The latter two effects
are more pronounced for options than they are for stock. The exposure to share price
created by a $1 million option grant may be several times greater than the exposure
created by a $1 million stock grant.106 Moreover, the discount to market value
assessed by non-diversified executives is greater for risky options than stock and
increases with the required holding period.107 As a result, we should expect that
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requiring executives to hold equity compensation until retirement would shift their
preferences in the direction of stock, that negotiated compensation packages would
include more stock, and that, as a result and all else being equal, executives would act
more conservatively. In the current environment, of course, the prospect of
executives acting more conservatively sounds pretty good. The concern is that the
balance could shift too far in the other direction, placing a brake on the long-term
performance of U.S. companies.
E. Risk of Circumvention
Most of the proposals we have seen aim to deter short-termism by specifying the
form and/or term of executive incentive pay, but not the amount or fraction of such
pay. To the extent that their plan would be compulsory, Bhagat and Romano, for
example, would require that any and all incentive pay consist of either restricted stock
or restricted options that may not vest until some period after retirement, but,
apparently, they would leave the mix of incentive and non-incentive pay up to
individual firms. As this section demonstrates, however, unless a floor is placed on
incentive pay or a cap on non-incentive pay, mandating lengthy holding periods for
incentive pay could lead to circumvention that undermines the link between pay and
long-term performance. Circumvention could be avoided by placing a restriction on
the amount or fraction of incentive or non-incentive pay, but doing so would magnify
one-size-fits-all inefficiencies.
Let us continue to consider compulsory regulation along the lines proposed by
Bhagat and Romano. They suggest that firms should increase salaries to provide
executives with liquidity to make up for the lengthy holding periods for stock and
options they propose, and they suggest that the IRC § 162(m) limit on the
deductibility of non-performance-based pay be increased from $1 million to $3
million, accordingly.108 But unless non-incentive pay is capped, firms might respond
to long holding periods placed on incentive pay by reducing or even eliminating
incentive pay and increasing salaries. Thus, an approach of this sort could undermine
the link between pay and long-term performance.
Some readers might believe that the § 162(m) limit on the deduction for nonperformance-based pay effectively caps non-incentive pay and would limit
circumvention. I am not so sure. Today, despite their ability to qualify compensation
as performance based and achieve deductibility, many firms grant non-deductible
compensation to their senior executives.109 As firms routinely state in the proxy
materials, deductibility is a factor, but not a prerequisite, in designing executive pay
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packages.110 If vesting limitations along the lines proposed by Bhagat and Romano
were mandated, I would expect many firms to shift from incentive pay to salary
despite the lack of deductibility under § 162(m).111 Public companies would not have
to abandon incentive alignment to do so. Companies could require executives to
purchase firm equity on the open market as a condition of employment.112
I am not, to be sure, advocating a cap on executive salaries. I am simply pointing
out that executive pay regulation taking this form is undermined absent such a cap.
The Treasury’s February 2009 plan would have capped executive salaries at $500,000
in addition to requiring that incentive pay be in the form of restricted stock.113 Again,
this plan was limited to bailout firms, but as a model for more general regulation it is
even more problematic than the Bhagat and Romano proposal. First, this type of
approach would not eliminate circumvention unless it also capped perks, benefits,
retirement contributions, etc. Second, if it did effectively cap all non-incentive pay, it
would have gone well beyond the goal of linking pay to long-term performance. The
regulation would have specified the instruments and, in the case of salary, capped the
amount of one of the instruments. At this point, the plan would have eliminated
almost all firm discretion and diversity related to executive pay. Given the diversity
in executive age, tenure, expenses, and other factors, it should be obvious that a onesize-fits-all cap on the salary component of pay would be highly inefficient. (It
should also be obvious that a sizable amount of restricted stock would be needed to
compensate executives for the salary cap.)
Another way to prevent circumvention would be to require that some fraction of
total executive compensation awarded each year consist of incentive pay of certain
specified form, as Judge Posner has recently advocated.114 But the arbitrary fraction
selected would impose another inefficient one-size-fits-all restriction on pay
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packages, and the annual nature of this restriction is also troubling. Equity
compensation grants are often lumpy; they are not made every year.115 Imagine a
firm that has just hired a new CEO and made a large equity grant to attract the
executive and align her incentives with shareholders. The firm may not need to grant
more equity compensation in the following year. Its compensation focus might turn
to salary or annual incentives. Thus, an arbitrary annual specification of the fraction
of compensation that must consist of long-term incentives would not only be a much
poorer fit for some firms than others, it would also be a poorer fit for a particular firm
in some years than in others.

V. ARE THERE BETTER WAYS TO COMBAT SHORT-TERMISM?

Given the considerable challenges and potential negative consequences inherent
in any attempt to coercively regulate the form and term of executive compensation, it
is not clear that the project should be undertaken. To be sure, minor adjustments
might be made that could prove beneficial. For example, firms might be required to
include effective clawback provisions in executive compensation plans that would
facilitate the recoupment of bonuses predicated on inaccurate financial results that are
later restated.116 However, even if the potential benefits of further regulation do not
outweigh the pitfalls, Congress may feel compelled to regulate more comprehensively
nonetheless. Recognizing this possibility, this Part suggests that the regulatory
approaches analyzed above may not strike the best balance between mitigating shorttermism and avoiding harmful consequences. This Part offers two ideas that policy
makers should consider if faced with the job of crafting a regulatory response to
short-termism: focusing regulation solely on the term of pay and adopting a
comprehensive disclosure-based response.
A. Regulation of the Term of Pay but Not the Instruments
If the primary concern is discouraging reckless, short-term behavior, including
earnings manipulation, fraud, and bet-the-company risk taking, policy makers should
consider regulating the term of pay but leaving the choice of pay instruments up to
individual companies. Forcing an executive to hold stock, options, or unsecured
creditor interests for a certain period should cause the executive to think twice about
risking the solvency of the business. And, of course, limiting regulatory intervention
to term would allow firms the leeway to choose the most efficient long-term
incentives for their situation.
For example, the approach advocated by Judge Posner could be modified to
require only that some fraction of pay not vest for a specified number of years, or
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Bhagat and Romano’s approach could be modified to require only that all pay beyond
salary (and perhaps a limited budget for perks) remain unvested until retirement plus
two to four years. The unvested pay could take the form of stock, an option, a longterm accounting-based incentive, or, as suggested above, even an unsecured creditor
interest, such as deferred compensation.
Alternatively, term-only regulation could be based on a comprehensive measure
of the average holding period of an executive’s pay package. Imagine, for example, a
rule mandating a minimum four year weighted average holding period for CEO pay.
This approach would continue to ensure that executives are bound to their firms
economically for an extended period, but would allow firms even greater flexibility in
designing pay packages. The four year minimum could be achieved, for example, by
dividing compensation equally into current salary and stock or options that do not
vest for eight years, by deferring all compensation for four years in whatever form or
forms the company and executive agrees to, or through some other combination.
A term-only approach would permit greater diversity in compensation design and
mitigate some of the harshest aspects the approaches we have considered. Allowing
firms to bind executives to the long-term fortune of their companies through
accounting-based incentives and even deferred cash compensation would mitigate
valuation and diversification problems inherent in approaches limiting incentive pay
to equity-based instruments. A term-only approach would still have a one-size-fits-all
aspect, but the greater flexibility for compensation design should mitigate
inefficiencies and reduce the incentive to circumvent the regulation.
However, a term-only approach might have an adverse effect on executive
conservatism. As we have seen, extending holding periods for equity pay increases
the gap between shareholder cost and executive value. As a result, the flexibility to
choose between instruments would tend to result in a less risky basket of instruments
and greater executive conservatism.117 Naturally, the degree to which compensation
risk would be reduced would depend on the length of term imposed. Requiring
executives to hold pay until retirement would result in a much greater shift away from
risk than requiring that a fraction of pay be held for, say, five or six years.
Given the risk of excessive conservatism, I cannot claim that term-only
approaches dominate instrument-specific regulation aimed at combating shorttermism. Nonetheless, if regulation is to be undertaken, policy makers should
consider term-only approaches as alternatives to existing instrument-specific
proposals.
B. Disclosure-Based Regulation
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This essay has focused on compulsory regulation aimed at improving the link
between executive pay and long-term company performance, and, to the extent that
short-termism is a result of market myopia and/or externalities, it seems likely that
some degree of coercion probably would be needed to effect change. Enhanced
disclosure of executive pay practices, for example, is unlikely to result in firms
increasing holding periods if shareholders prefer the current arrangements.
Unfortunately, highly coercive regulation carries the greatest collateral risks and
costs. One-size-fits-all regulation inevitably involves some over-inclusiveness, and
firms have little choice but to comply with compulsory regulation.118
On the other hand, to the extent that short-termism is driven by managerial
myopia and agency problems, there might be a useful role for enhanced disclosure.
Were it not for the opacity of complex and diverse compensation arrangements, so
this story goes, boards and shareholders would adjust compensation arrangements to
increase the link between executive wealth and long-term company performance (or
at least the link between executive wealth and company solvency).
The average holding period of pay discussed in the previous subsection might
provide a reasonable basis for a disclosure-based regime. In order to avoid the type
of circumvention that plagued the SEC’s former piecemeal executive pay disclosure
requirements, disclosure of the term of executive pay should be comprehensive, and
disclosure of an average holding period that includes every element of compensation
would be comprehensive.119
One can, in fact, imagine a range of possible disclosure metrics extending from
simple weighted average holding period, which would serve as a measure of
protection against bet-the-company risks, to more complex measures involving both
the term of pay and sensitivity of pay to performance. The potential benefits of such
disclosure would include facilitating comparison between firms on the extent to
which executive pay packages are focused on the long term, providing baseline data
and context to administrators evaluating more coercive regulatory proposals, giving
outside directors ammunition in negotiating pay packages with senior executives, and
giving shareholders who have a “say on pay” a consistent basis for evaluating the
term as well as the amount of executive compensation proposed by the directors.120
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A disclosure-based approach to combating short-termism would minimize the
collateral damage from regulation, but disclosure alone is unlikely to have the same
effect on compensation design and short-termism as more coercive regulation. That’s
the tradeoff. Whether it is a good tradeoff depends on the extent and ultimate source
of the short-termism problem. Given considerable uncertainty on both counts,
however, caution is warranted.

VI. CONCLUSION

If combating earnings manipulation and reckless short-term behavior were the
only issues, crafting a regulatory response to short-termism would be a fairly easy
task. It’s not difficult to bind executive wealth to long-term firm performance and
deter managers from risking the solvency of their companies. But shareholders and
society care about more than solvency. We are also interested in the efficiency of
compensation and in encouraging executives to take appropriate risks that maximize
the long-term prospects of our companies. These conflicting priorities create a
difficult balancing act, too difficult, perhaps, to be the subject of one-size-fits-all,
coercive regulation.
So what can be done to reduce short-termism? Despite the lack of empirical
evidence, I share the view that executive pay probably is too short term focused,
systemically, as a result of managerial agency problems and opacity, and thus count
myself among those frustrated by the barriers to fruitful coercive regulation.
First, we can work to mitigate the underlying agency problems through improved
board structure and governance practices,121 and we can directly address the other
potential underlying causes of short-termism, such as market myopia, through
education, market reforms, and improved reporting.122 Second, we can employ less
coercive means of encouraging firms to increase the long-term focus of executive pay
that will minimize unintended consequences. Comprehensive disclosure of the term
of executive pay might be one approach. Another would be increased pressure on
firms from congressional committees and proxy advisors to extend incentive holding
periods.123 Persuasion would be more effective, of course, if backed by empirical
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evidence linking longer incentive holding periods with reduced executive risk taking
and enhanced firm performance.

focus” and that forcing executives to hold stock until retirement “can encourage a long-term focus.”
See RiskMetrics Group, supra note 121, at 28-29.
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